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Abstract
In this paper I examine the incentives of regions to unite, to separate
and to provide public goods. Separation allows for greater influence over
the nature of political decision making while unification allows regions to
exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods. When public
good provision is relatively inexpensive, separation occurs since individuals
want to assert greater influence, while for intermediate costs of public good
provision, separation can be explained by the desires for greater influence
as well as for more public goods. Compared with the social optimum,
there are excessive incentives for public good provision as well as excessive
incentives for separation.
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1 Introduction
In the last 20 years, changes in boundaries attracted attention in the general press
as well as in academic research. Some well known examples are the disintegration
of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. On the contrary, we have seen the
German re-unification and steps to further economic and monetary integration in
Europe1. Academic researchers have found that majority voting induces excessive
incentives for separation -see the discussion of the literature below-. In this paper
I develop a framework to study how the incentives for public good provision and
the incentives for unification and separation are related.
In the model, I assume that there are two regions which can choose to separate
and form two independent countries or to unite and form one country. Under
separation, one type of the public good should be provided per country. Individ-
uals in a union, however, have the additional possibility that they may choose to
form a federation in which they can mimic something they could achieve under
separation, namely the provision of two types of the public good. In a union, the
individuals can thus choose to provide one or two types of the public good. If
there is disagreement between the two regions in the decision on unification then
the two regions will separate. After those decisions, individuals in each political
territory choose the type or location of the public good. This determines, for ex-
ample, where the capitals, the main airports, the universities and other facilities
are located. In this spirit, location choices may be interpreted geographically.
The model also permits an interpretation in terms of individual preferences more
general. In the latter preference interpretation, individuals who are close to each
other are assumed to have the same preferred type of public good. Public goods
located far from individuals differ more from the preferred type of public good
of these individuals than from the preferred type of public good of the individu-
als who are located in close proximity of the public good. One can for example
think of cultural preferences. The people living close to the boundary then have
a lower payoff than other individuals since they are far from the public good and
since they prefer to have a different type of public good. In both interpretations,
1See The Times Atlas [1993, Plate 8] for a survey map on border changes and changes in
sovereignty since 1945 and Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000) for more data on country
formation since 1870.
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however, individuals that are close to each other in preferences are also close to
each other in preferences.
There is a fixed cost for each type of the public good provided. In case of
separation, the individuals in each country have to bear this cost of their public
good separately. When there is a union, all individuals bear the costs of the
public goods provided, independent of whether two or just one type of the public
good is provided. This assumption generates the following trade-off 2: separation
allows individuals within a small region to exercise greater influence on political
decision-making, while unification allows them to exploit economies of scale in the
provision of public goods. The incentives for exercising greater influence are called
incentives for separation and the exploitation of economies of scale are called
incentives for unification. Individuals benefit from the public goods provided.
The incentives to increase the amounts provided, either under unification or under
separation, are called the incentives for public good provision. The novel insights
this approach offers are how the incentives for separation and the incentives for
public good provision are connected. So far it is argued in the literature that
the inefficiently small size of countries stems from the excessive incentives for
separation, while I show that the incentives for public good provision also play a
role.
The fixed costs of providing public goods plays an important role in shaping the
trade-off voters face. My finding is that for high fixed costs, unification only takes
place between relatively similar sized regions. Since the costs of providing public
goods are relatively high, individuals will choose to have only one type of the
public goods in a union. This result arises out of the different ways in which
the political costs of unification compare with the tax advantages. In particular,
political costs of unification vary linearly with the size of the other region, while
the tax advantages are increasing and (strictly) convex in the size of the other
region. This implies that relative to the costs the gains from unification decline
for the larger region as the small region becomes smaller. Thus large regions are
reluctant to form unions. This is motivated by the incentives for separation as
2This trade-off as well as some other features are similar to the models presented in Alesina
and Spolaore (1997, 2003) and Goyal and Staal (2004). I discuss the relationship of the model
with these papers in detail below. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) present empirical evidence that
supports the existence of scale effects in the provision of public goods.
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well as by the incentives for public good provision.
I find that for low fixed costs of providing public goods, on the contrary, separation
takes place relatively similar sized regions. Since the costs of providing public
goods is relatively low, individuals will choose to provide two types of the public
good in a union. This result arises out of the same way costs and benefits of
unification are compared as the way for relative high values of the fixed costs.
Individuals in the large region, however, prefer separation to exert more influence
on the type of public goods provided.
I next examine the social welfare implications of decisions made on the basis
of these preferences. The main finding is that majority voting leads to excessive
separation and excessive provision of public goods. For low fixed costs of providing
public goods, it is optimal to provide two types of the public good and we observe
excessive incentives for separation. For intermediate fixed costs, it is optimal to
provide one type of the public good and we observe excessive incentives for public
good provision along with excessive incentives for separation. When public good
provision is costly, provision of one type of the public good is optimal as well as
the majority voting outcome. The excessive incentives arise out of the way the
costs and benefits of unification and public good provision are distributed. The
costs in terms of higher per capita tax rates are borne equally by individuals in a
region. On the other hand, the benefits from separation and from providing two
types of the public good depend on an individual’s location. Individuals located
close to the boundary between the regions loose relatively more from separation
while individuals away from the boundaries gain more from separation. When
individuals choose to provide two types of public goods instead of one type,
individuals located close to the type of the single public good will loose relatively
more than others. The vote of an individual thus generates externalities on other
voters; in particular, the analysis shows that voting tends to under-represent the
interests of the voters which are losing from separation or from the provision of
an additional type of the public good.
This paper is a contribution to the study of the break-up and formation of na-
tions. In recent years, there have been considerable interest in these issues, see
e.g. Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003), Bolton and Roland (1997) and Goyal
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and Staal (2004).3 This political economy work is related the local public good
literature and the literature on fiscal federalism4. In particular, this paper is
closely related to the papers by Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003) and Goyal
and Staal (2004).
Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003) study the influence of different factors,
such as the level of market integration and democratization, in determining the
equilibrium number and sizes of countries. The economic advantages of unifi-
cation are compared with the political costs of a public good which is located
further away in a larger country. In this setting, they find that democratization
leads to an inefficiently large number of countries. In the analysis, the boundaries
between nations are endogenous and attention is restricted to equal sized coun-
tries. The analysis of Goyal and Staal (2004) is based on the same trade-off as
the one used be Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003). Separation allows for greater
influence over the nature of political decision making while unification allows the
exploitation of economies of scale in the provision of public goods. They study
the influence of size, location, the diversity within regions and the role of political
institutions in shaping this trade-off. An important assumption in the analysis
mentioned above is that in a country only one type of the public good can be
provided. In this paper I relax this assumption by allowing individuals in a union
to mimic the diversity of public goods provision under separation. Individuals
can choose to provide two types of public goods in a union. For high values for
the fixed costs of providing public goods the outcomes are identical to the out-
comes found by Goyal and Staal (2004), but for low values they did not allow for
the provision of two public goods in a union, which I find as the voting outcome.
The contribution of this paper is how the incentives for unification, separation
and public good provision are related, which is especially interesting in the cases
for moderate and low costs of public good provision.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I present the
model. Section 3 presents the outcome under majority voting and Section 4 the
3See Bolton, Roland and Spolaore (1996) for a more extensive review of the early literature.
4For the local public good theory, see Austin [1993], Benabou [1993], Bewley [1981], Epple
and Romer [1991], Jehiel and Scotchmer [2003], Rubinfeld [1987], Scotchmer [1996], Stahl and
Varaiya [1983] and Tiebout [1956]. For literature on fiscal federalism, see Oates [1972], Persson
and Tabellini [2000] and Wildasin [1988].
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socially optimal outcome. Section 5 concludes with a comparison of the two
outcomes and with some more general comments.
2 The model
Suppose that different types of public goods can be provided. The range of all
possible types of the public good is normalized in the segment [0, 1]. The type of
the public good is denoted by l. In addition, assume that the total population has
mass one and that individuals from this population are located at ideal points,
which indicate their type of the public good. The individuals are uniformly
distributed on the segment [0, 1]. The utility of each individual is decreasing
with the distance from his public good to his location (i.e. his ideal point).
Assume that there are two regions with a fixed (exogenous) boundary α and that
the two regions can form one or two nations, or ”countries”. The region located
on the left-hand side of α is called region A, while the region on the right-hand
side of α is called region B. Without loss of generality, suppose that 0 < α < 1/2.
I assume that there is a fixed cost F per public good. This F includes for example
the costs of building airports and hospitals and the costs of having a machinery
of government. Every individual has the same exogenous income y, and pays the
lump-sum tax t.5 Now, we can define the utility function for each individual i as
follows:
U(i) = g(1− adi) + y − t (1)
where g and a are two positive parameters. The parameter g measures the utility
of the public good when the preference distance di is zero and the parameter
a measures the loss in utility if the public good is farther away (i.e. when di
increases). The preference distance di is the difference between the location of
individual i and the location of the closest public good in the country where indi-
vidual i is located. The utility function is thus linear in the preference distance. I
assume that a < 1, which ensures that a higher g increases utility. The marginal
utility of the public good located at a distance di is then equal to 1− adi.
5Proportional taxation with different tax levels across regions is not sustainable when the
subject of taxation (e.g. capital or labor) is mobile in a union. In the model with exogenous
income levels which are equal across the regions lump-sum taxation is equivalent to proportional
taxation. I assume that individual wealth is equal in the two regions.
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I look at the incentives for separation and unification under majority voting.
Separation occurs if a majority of voters is in favor of separation in at least one
region.6 In this case one of the public goods has to be located in the small region
and the other in the large region. The individuals also have the option to have
two public goods in a union. In that case they are free to choose any pair of
locations they want. Finally the individuals can choose to have a union with one
public good.
Under majority voting, decisions are thus taken in three stages. In the first
stage individuals decide how many countries they want to have. If a majority
of the individuals in a region prefers to have two nations over one nation the
individuals will decide where they want to locate the public goods but if majorities
of the individuals in each region prefer to form a union then in the second stage
the individuals will decide whether they want to have one or two public goods. In
the third stage individuals decide where they want to locate the public good(s).
3 Majority voting
In this section I examine the outcomes when the decision to form one country
with one or two public goods or two countries is taken by majority voting. The
decision on the locations of the public goods is studied before the decision on
unification and separation.
The decision on the location of the two public goods in one nation: Consider the
locations of the public goods when individuals prefer to have a union with two
public goods. Define X = {x1, x2} as a pair of two locations for the two public
goods and define X¯ = {1/4, 3/4} .
Lemma 3.1. X¯ is preferred by a majority in a nation-wide referendum to any
other pair of locations for the two public goods.
6This voting rule is realistic when the central government is too weak or does not want
to prevent secession through military means. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union,
for example, took place after the central government could not prevent secessions. The past
referendum in East Timor and the upcoming referendum in Montenegro are other examples of
this procedure.
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Proof: Assume, without loss of generality, that x1 < x2. All the possible devia-
tions from X¯ are captured in the following cases:
I {0 < x1 < 1/4, x2 = 3/4} or {x1 = 1/4, 3/4 < x2 < 1}
II {1/4 < x1 < 3/4, x2 = 3/4} or {x1 = 1/4, 1/4 < x2 < 3/4}
III {0 < x1 < 1/4, x1 < x2 < 3/4} or {1/4 < x1 < x2, 3/4 < x2 < 1}
IV {0 < x1 < 1/4, 3/4 < x2 < 1}
V {1/4 < x1 < x2, x1 < x2 < 3/4}
In all cases, there are two public goods. The tax burden will therefore be the
same in all cases. In the decision where to locate the two public goods we can
therefore focus on the distance between the location of the public good located
closest to an individual and the location of this individual. An individual will
prefer a set of locations of two public goods over another set of locations if the
distance to the public good is smaller.
Case I: Let XI = {0 < x1 < 1/4, x2 = 3/4} denote a pair of two locations for
the two public goods. Individuals in the interval (1/2, 1) are indifferent between
X¯ and XI . The individuals in the interval (0,
x1+1/4
2
) are in favor of XI , but
the individuals in (x1+1/4
2
, 1/2) are in favor of X¯. Since x1 > 1/4 there is thus a
majority in favor of X¯. A similar argument applies to {x1 = 1/4, 3/4 < x2 < 1}.
Case II: LetXII = {1/4 < x1 < 3/4, x2 = 3/4} denote a pair of two locations for
the two public goods. Individuals in the interval (x1+3/4
2
, 1) are indifferent between
X¯ and XII . The individuals in (0,
1/4+x1
2
) are in favor of X¯, but the individuals
in (1/4+x1
2
, x1+3/4
2
) are in favor of XII . Since x1 > 1/4 there is thus a majority in
favor of X¯. A similar argument applies to {x1 = 1/4, 1/4 < x2 < 3/4}.
Case III: Let XIII = {0 < x1 < 1/4, x1 < x2 < 3/4} denote a pair of two
locations for the two public goods. Individuals in the interval (x2+3/4
2
, 1) are in
favor of X¯, likewise the individuals in the interval (x1+1/4
2
, 1/4+x2
2
) prefer X¯ over
XIII . Thus, in total
1− x2 + 3/4
2
+
1/4 + x2
2
− x1 + 1/4
2
=
5/4− x1
2
(2)
This is more than 1/2 since x1 < 1/4. Hence, there is a majority in favor of X¯.
A similar argument applies to {1/4 < x1 < x2, 3/4 < x2 < 1}.
Case IV : Let XIV = {0 < x1 < 1/4, 3/4 < x2 < 1} denote a pair of two locations
for the two public goods. Individuals in the interval (x1+1/4
2
, 3/4+x2
2
) are in favor
of X¯. Since x1 < 1/4 and x2 > 3/4 it follows that a majority prefers X¯ over XIV .
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Case V : Let XV = {1/4 < x1 < x2, x1 < x2 < 3/4} denote a pair of two locations
for the two public goods. Individuals in the interval (0, 1/4+x1
2
) and (x2+3/4
2
, 1) are
in favor of X¯. Since x1 > 1/4 and x2 < 3/4 it follows that a majority prefers X¯
over XV .
It follows from the median-voter theorem that in a union with one public good
the public good will be located at 1/2. Likewise in case of two nations the two
public goods will be located in the center of each nation, respectively.
The decision to have one or two public goods: Now examine the incentives of a
nation to have one or two public goods. If public goods are cheap there will be
two public goods, otherwise there will be one public good. This is formally stated
in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. In a nationwide referendum a majority of the individuals will prefer
to have one public good over two public goods if and only if F > ga/4.
Proof: The individuals at 1/4 and 3/4 are the median voters.7 Due to the
symmetry in the model, it suffices to check the preferences of one of the two.
The individual at 1/4 prefers one public good over two public goods if and only
if U1PG(1/4) > U2PG(1/4):
g(1− 1
4
a)− F + y > g − 2F + y (3)
Hence, a majority of the voters prefers to have a union with one public good over
a union with two public goods when F > ga/4.
Preferences over unification and separation in the small region: First observe
that if α is very small then the per capita cost of supporting an independent
public good, F/α, becomes very large and the individuals in the small region will
therefore benefit significantly from unification. Next observe that in a union with
two public goods the individuals in the small region will be located closer to the
public good than in a union with only one public good. The analysis of these
issues is summarized in the following lemma.
7It is straightforward to check that if the individual at 1/4 prefers a union with two public
goods then all voters in the intervals [0, 1/4] and [3/4, 1] prefer a union with two public goods
and that if the individual at 1/4 prefers a union with one public good then all voters in the
interval [1/4, 3/4] prefer a union with one public good.
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Lemma 3.3. If F < ga/4 then a majority of the individuals in the small region
prefers unification for all α < 4F/ga. If F > ga/4 then a majority of the
individuals in the small region prefers unification for all α < 2F/ga.
Proof: If F < ga/4 then there will be two public goods located at {1/4, 3/4}
in a union. In the small region the median voter is located at α/2. The median
voter will prefer unification over independence if and only if his utility in a union,
U2PG, is larger than his utility under separation, UII :
U2PG(
α
2
) = g(1− a|1
4
− α
2
|)− 2F + y > g − F
α
+ y = UII(
α
2
) (4)
That is, if α < 4F/ga.
If F > ga/4 then there will be one public good located at 1/2 in a union. More-
over, there is a majority in favor of unification in the small region if and only if
the median voter α/2 prefers unification:
U1PG(
α
2
) = g(1− a|1
2
− α
2
|)− F + y > g − F
α
+ y = UII(
α
2
) (5)
That is, if α < 2F/ga.
Preferences over unification and separation in the large region: The individuals
in the large region also compare the benefit of a lower tax rate with the change
in the location of the public good.
Lemma 3.4. If F < ga/4 then a majority of the individuals in the large region
prefers unification for all α < 1 − 4F/ga. If F > ga/4 then a majority of the
individuals in the large region prefers unification for all α > 1− 2F/ga.
Proof: First consider the case of F > ga/4. There will be a single public good in
case of unification. There is a majority in favor of unification in the large region
if the median voter (1 + α)/2 prefers unification:
UII(
1 + α
2
) = g + y − F
1− α < g(1− a
α
2
) + y − F = UI(1 + α
2
) (6)
That is, if α > 1− 2F/ga.
Consider now the case of F < ga/4. In case of unification there will now be
two public goods located at 1/4 and 3/4. In this case we cannot apply the
median voter theorem directly to determine the voting outcome on a union with
10
two public goods versus separation. Instead of looking at the preferences of a
median voter I will first look at the preferences of the voters at (1 + α)/2 and
3/4. There are four possibilities: (A) both voters prefer separation, (B) both
prefer unification, (C) (1 + α)/2 prefers unification and 3/4 prefers separation or
(D) (1 + α)/2 prefers separation and 3/4 prefers unification. The individual at
(1 + α)/2, however, will always prefer separation over unification since he pays
more tax in a union but the public good is located farther away. We therefore
do not need to pay attention to the cases (B) and (C): they are impossible.
A look at Figure 1 shows the following.
In a union utility is decreasing with respect to location for the individuals in
(1/4, 1/2) and (3/4, 1), while for the individuals in (0, 1/4) and (1/2, 3/4) utility
is increasing with respect to location. Analogously, utility under separation is de-
creasing with respect to location for the individuals in (α/2, α) and ((1+α)/2, 1),
while for the individuals in (0, α/2) and (α, (1 + α)/2) utility is decreasing with
respect to location. 3/4 is always larger than (1+α)/2 since α < 1/2. Therefore,
if individual 3/4 prefers separation, then all individuals between (1 + α)/2 and
3/4 prefer separation (case A) as well. Moreover, a majority of the individuals in
the large region then prefers separation over unification. The individual at 3/4
prefers separation when his utility under unification, U2PG(3/4), is lower than his
utility under separation, UII(3/4)
U2PG(3/4) = g − 2F + y < g(1− a|3
4
− 1 + α
2
|)− F
1− α + y = UII(3/4) (7)
That is, if α > 1− 4F/ga.
So for 4 < F < ga/4 and α > 1− 4F/ga the individual at 3/4 prefers separation
over unification with two public goods and hence a majority of the individuals in
the large region prefers separation over unification.
Now take case D. I will show that a majority of the voters in the large region
prefers unification in this case. Since utility is continuous with respect to location
in a union, there should be some individual between (1 + α)/2 and 3/4 who is
indifferent between unification and separation. I call this individual R. In a
union, the utility of the individuals in (1/4, 1/2) is decreasing with respect to
location, while under separation utility is increasing with respect to location. I
therefore claim that there is an individual who is indifferent between unification
11
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Figure 1: Preference of voters.
12
and separation. I call this individual L. All the individuals located between L
and R are in favor of separation.
To find the value of L use the payoff under unification, U2PG(L), and the payoff
under separation, UII(L), to determine the value of L for which both payoffs are
equal.
U2PG(L) = g(1−a|1
4
−L|)−2F+y = g(1−a|L− 1 + α
2
|)− F
1− α+y = UII(L) (8)
This equality is satisfied for
L =
3
8
− F
ga
+
1
4
α +
F
2ga(1− α) (9)
Note that for α < 1/4 the utility of the individual at 1/4 is higher in a union
with two public goods than under separation. This follows from:
U2PG(
1
4
) = g + y − 2F > g(1− a(1 + α
2
− 1
4
)) + y − F
1− α = UI(
1
4
) (10)
that is, if α < 1 − 4F/ga, which is satisfied since for α > 1 − 4F/ga both
individuals would prefer separation. For α > 1/4 the utility of the individual at
α is higher in under unification than under separation. This is shown as follows:
UI(α) = g(1− a(α− 1
4
− α)) + y − 2F >
g(1− a(1 + α
2
− α)) + y − F
1 + α
= U2PG(α) (11)
that is, if α < 1− 4F/3ga, which is satisfied when α < 1− 4F/ga. From this it
follows that L is indeed in the large region between α and 1/2.
To find the value of R use the payoff under unification, U2PG(R), and the
payoff under separation, UII(R), to determine the value of R for which both
payoffs are equal.
U2PG(R) = g(1−a|3
4
−R|)− 2F + y = g(1−a|R− 1 + α
2
|)− F
1− α + y = UII(R)
(12)
This equality is satisfied for
R =
5
8
+
F
ga
+
1
4
α− F
2ga(1− α) (13)
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The individuals in favor of separation, i.e. the individuals between L and R, form
a majority if
R− L > 1− α
2
(14)
This condition can be rewritten as α > 1− 4F/ga, which is never satisfied since
for α > 1 − 4F/ga case A would obtain. Hence we see that when F < ga/4 for
α < 1−4F/ga we will never observe a majority in favor of separation in the large
region.
I summarize the outcomes under majority voting in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.1. The outcomes under majority voting are given as follows: (a)
If F < ga/8 then there is unification if and only if α ∈ (0, 4F/ga], (b) If ga/8 <
F < ga/4 then there is unification if and only if α ∈ [1 − 4F/ga, 4F/ga], (c) If
ga/4 < F < ga/2 then there is unification if and only if α ∈ [1 − 2F/ga, 1/2],
(d) If ga/2 < F then there is unification for all α ∈ [0, 1/2).
These results are illustrated in Figure 2. This figure also shows what the
socially optimal outcome is. The socially optimal outcomes are discussed in
more detail in Section 4.
For low values of F (F < ga/4) and relatively large values of α we observe sepa-
ration. Individuals in the large region have incentives for separation so that they
can exert more influence on the type of public good provided, while individuals
in the small region always prefer a union with two public goods. For intermediate
values of F (ga/4 < F < ga/2) we observe separation when α is relatively small.
Individuals in the large region prefer separation in order to provide relatively
more public goods (incentives for public good provision) and to have a greater
influence on its type (incentives for separation), while the individuals in the small
region always prefer a union with one public good. Finally, when public good
provision is costly (F > ga/2) a majority in both regions prefer a union with one
public good.
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4 Social optimum
The social optimum: I start by observing that two public goods located at 1/4
and 3/4 induce lower transport costs as compared to two public goods located at
α/2 and (1 + α)/2. Hence it is socially better to have a union with two public
goods as compared to two separate nations.
Lemma 4.1. In all cases a union with two public goods is preferred over two
separate nations with public goods in each nation.
Proof: In the social optimum the sum of all individual utilities is maximized.
If it is optimal to have a union with two public goods, then it will be socially
optimal to choose the location of the public goods and the tax level to maximize
the aggregate payoff U2PG to all individuals in a union with two public goods:
U2PG =
∫ 1
0
U2PG(i)di = g(1− aE(di|l)) + y − E(t) (15)
where E(di|l) and E(t) are, respectively, the average distance to the public good
closest to individual i given the locations of the two public goods and E(t) the
lump sum tax level in the nation. In order to minimize E(di) it is socially optimal
to locate the two public goods at 1/4 and 3/4. E(di|l) will then be 1/8. Since
there are two public goods, E(t) will be 2F .
If it is optimal to have two separate nations with two public goods then it
will be socially optimal to choose the locations of the public goods and the tax
levels to maximize the aggregate payoff UII to all individuals in the two nations:
UII =
∫ 1
0
UII(i)di =
∑
x=A,B
sx[g(1− aEx(di|lx)) + y − Ex(t)] (16)
where Ex(di|lx), sx and Ex(t) are, respectively, the average distance in country x
given the location of the public good, the size of country x and the lump sum tax
level in country x. Since the value of α is exogenously specified, the values of sA
and sB are α and 1 − α, respectively. In order to minimize Ex(di) it is socially
optimal to locate the public good in the middle of each country. Hence, EA(di),
EB(di) and E(di) are, respectively, α/4, (1 − α)/4 and 1/4. Each country has
to finance its own public good, therefore EA(t), EB(t) and E(t) are, respectively,
F/α, F/(1− α) and F .
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Hence, both social utility expressions can be rewritten as follows:
U2PG = g(1− a
8
) + y − 2F (17)
UII = α[g(1− aα
4
)] + (1− α)[g(1− a1− α
4
)] + y − 2F (18)
A union with two public goods will always be preferred over two separate nations
if U2PG > UII for all possible parameter values. Rearranging the terms in the
inequality U2PG > UII gives the following inequality:
1
2
α2 − 1
2
α+
1
8
> 0 (19)
Since this inequality always holds, a union with two public goods is always better
than two separate nations.
To determine the social optima we thus have to choose between a union with two
public goods and a union with a single public good. If the costs of the public
good are high, i.e. if F is big, then it is socially optimal to have one public good.
The following proposition summarizes these considerations.
Proposition 4.1. If F > ga/8 then a union with one public good will be the
social optimum and if F < ga/8 then a union with two public goods will be the
social optimum.
Proof: In the social optimum the sum of all individual utilities is maximized.
If it is optimal to have a union with two public goods, then it will be socially
optimal to choose the location of the public goods and the tax level to maximize
the aggregate payoff U2PG to all individuals in a union with two public goods:
U2PG =
∫ 1
0
U2PG(i)di = g(1− aE(di|l)) + y − E(t) (20)
where E(di|l) and E(t) are, respectively, the average distance to the public good
closest to individual i given the locations of the two public goods and E(t) the
lump sum tax level in the nation. In order to minimize E(di) it is socially optimal
to locate the two public goods at 1/4 and 3/4. E(di|l) will then be 1/8. Since
there are two types of public goods, E(t) will be 2F .
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If it is optimal to have a union with two public goods, then it will be socially
optimal to choose the location of the public goods and the tax level to maximize
the aggregate payoff U1PG to all individuals in a union with two public goods:
U1PG =
∫ 1
0
U1PG(i)di = g(1− aE(di|l)) + y − E(t) (21)
where E(di|l) and E(t) are, respectively, the average distance given the location
of the public good and the lump sum tax level in the nation. In order to minimize
E(di) it is socially optimal to locate the two public goods at 1/2. E(di|l) will
then be 1/4. Since there is one type of the public good, E(t) will be F .
Hence, both social utility expressions can be rewritten as follows:
U1PG = g(1− a
4
) + y − F (22)
U2PG = g(1− a
8
) + y − 2F (23)
Comparing the total utilities under unification and separation determines the
choice for either one or two public goods in a union. It is better to have one
public good if and only if U1PG > U2PG:
U1PG = g(1− a
4
) + y − F > g(1− a
8
) + y − 2F = U2PG (24)
After rearranging terms, we find that a union with one public good is the social
optimum if F > ga/8
5 Comparison
Majority voting and social optimum compared: A comparison of the outcomes
under majority voting and the social optima reveals:
Proposition 5.1. (i) If F < ga/8 then a union with two public goods is so-
cially optimal for all α ∈ [0, 1/2] but a union with two public goods obtains
for all α ∈ [0, 4F/ga] and separation obtains under majority voting for all α ∈
[4F/ga, 1/2], (ii) If ga/8 < F < ga/4 then a union with one public good is so-
cially optimal for all α ∈ [0, 1/2] but a union with two public goods obtains for
all α ∈ [1 − 4F/ga, 1/2] and separation obtains under majority voting for all
α ∈ [1− 4F/ga, 1/2], (iii) If ga/4 < F < ga/2 then a union with one public good
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is socially optimal for all α ∈ [0, 1/2] but separation obtains under majority voting
for all α ∈ [0, 1−2F/ga], and (iv) If F > ga/2 then a union with one public good
is socially optimal as well as the majority voting outcome for all α ∈ [0, 1/2].
These results are illustrated in Figures 2.8 One of the main findings of the above
result is that there exist excessive incentives for the provision of public goods.
For different values of F , there are also excessive incentives for separation, which
are partly due to the excessive incentives for public good provision. The excessive
incentives for public good provision appear most distinctly for ga/8 < F < ga/4
and small values of α, while the excessive incentives for separation appear most
distinctly for F < ga/8 and relatively large values of α. I now elaborate on the
sources of this inefficiency.
The excessive provision of public goods arise out of the way the costs and benefits
of the public goods are distributed. In a union the costs of an additional public
good are F which are borne equally by the individuals in the union because of
the lump-sum taxation system. On the other hand, the benefits of the additional
public good of an individual depend on the location of the individuals. The
individuals located in the center of the union will lose most from the second public
good in the union and the two groups of individuals located at both extremes
gain the most. The aggregate increase in the payoff of these individuals (located
towards the corners), however, is less than the decrease in the payoff of the
individuals located in the center of the region. In the case of separation the
individuals located close to the boundary between the two regions will lose the
most and again the individuals located to the corners will gain the most.
6 Concluding remarks
The analysis of this model yields us two principle insights. Firstly, the large
region is less keen on unification as compared to the small region. This result is
due to the fact that the tax advantages from union are increasing and (strictly)
convex in the size of the other region, while the political costs are linear. Thus a
8Note that F < ga/8 implies that 4F/ga < 1− 4F/ga, that F > ga/4 implies 1− 2F/ga <
2F/ga and that F > ga/2 implies that 2F/ga > 1 and 1− 2F/ga < 0 (and thus 1− 2F/ga <
2F/ga).
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union with a very small region fails to generate adequate tax advantages for the
large region for a certain class of parameters. In the large region the incentives
for unification are larger when the population in the large region is not uniformly
distributed but concentrated and when the political influence of the small region
in a union is smaller. Secondly, I find that the outcomes under majority voting
typically lead to too many public goods provided as compared to what is socially
optimal. This is due to the fact that whereas the tax advantages of having
one public good are shared evenly by voters in a region, the political costs are
unevenly distributed and this generates externalities which lead to inefficient
outcomes. These incentives for public good provision were so far ignored in the
related literature.
There are several directions in which the model can be extended. First, the
analysis presented in this paper makes a step to vary the amount of public goods
provided by allowing for the provision of two types of public goods in a union. A
genuine variable amount of the public goods, however, will provide more profound
insights into how the incentives for unification, for separation and for public good
provision are related. Second, the role of decentralized public good provision
-and connected, the spillover effects of public goods provision- deserves a more
thorough study. Third, one can examine the robustness of the results with respect
to a variety of voting rules. Fourth, I did not take into account the transfers a
government can make. These transfers can be inter-individual or inter-regional
and obviously have an effect on the incentives for unification.9 Another dimension
of the robustness question is how decisions on unification and separation are
affected by (the threat of) violence. There may be groups of persons who are
unhappy with the voting outcome and they may use violent means to have their
way.
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